I just finished reading Dan
Sperber’s Explaining Culture (1996), and have to return it to the library soon
– so I thought I would digitize some of the reading notes I had jotted down.
Overall, I thought the ideas were really cool. I’ve always been interested in
concepts like culture, shared reality, collective memory etc, so this book was
really up my alley. If anything, it game me the vocabulary to talk about the
relationship between psychology, sociology and anthropology. To be clear, this
isn’t really meant to be a review of the book as much as a summary of what I
thought were the mains points.
The central idea of the book
is to study culture as an epidemiology of
representations, and to think of population-scale macrophenomena as the
cumulative effect microprocesses that bring about individual events. In the
context of culture, these microprocesses are the instances of inter-individual
information transmission, which are in turn constrained by individual mental
processes (i.e. human cognition). That is to say, cultural transmission
involves the interplay of different ecological
(i.e. writing, oral) and psychological
(e.g., memory) processes.
There are two types of
representations – mental representations and public representations. Public
representations are often manifestations of mental ones. More crucially,
because mental representations are private and tied to the individual, a mental
representation has to be transformed into a public representation before it can
be transmitted. Hence, each transmission is associated with a transformation,
which leads to many opportunities for “mutations”. This is somewhat different
from genetic transmission, which often has high fidelity between generations.
In Sperber’s words – communication is transformation, not replication.
To push the analogy to
diseases even further, there are cultural endemics (traditions) and epidemics
(fashion). Cognitive processes are the different pathologies. Thus each
phenomenon can be different, with different explanations. The task is to explain
the distribution of representations, and not necessarily each representation.
What ties the study of culture together isn’t so much having the “same
mechanisms”, but rather the general approach, the types of questions asked and
the ways of constructing concepts.
A representation is defined
by two things – the object that it represents, and the information-processing
device that processes the representation. It is important to consider the
material properties of representation, because they have different effects on
cognitive processing. While anthropology has focused on the causal explanation
of cultural facts, and psychology has focused on the study of conceptual
thought processes. The study of culture has to bridge these two frameworks, and
seek to understand the psychological susceptibility to different cultural
phenomenon.
On this note, Sperber makes
the distinction between dispositions and susceptibility. Dispositions are
adaptations (that were selected for by evolution). Susceptibility is the side
effects that come with dispositions. In particular, meta-representational
ability is a human disposition, which in turn makes us susceptible to cultural
representations. It allows us to doubt and disbelief, but also allows us to
suspend doubt and disbelief. For
example, our meta-representational ability allows us to learn half-understood
ideas that build on things that are better understood. This has interesting
implications for religious beliefs, where we temporarily suspend our disbelief
based on respect for authority.
Sperber proposes two
mechanisms for transmission – communication vs. imitation. Here, we are more
interested in communication. He argues that the spread of ideas via
communication should be thought of more as a process of attraction, rather than
a process of selection. The outputs of which are not solely determined by
inputs, but also on constructive cognitive processes that transform the inputs
in a systematic, predictable way.
The last few chapters deal
with the modularity of the mind, and argue that the mind is likely modular, and
cultural diversity is compatible with a modular mind.